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Legal System of Louisiana
By RICHARD KILBOURNE*
INTRODUCTION
Few legal environments in the antebellum period were as
ripe as that of Louisiana for the development of commercial law.
Commercial practices shaped the development of commercial
law, and in principle the law merchant of the United States, (the
customs or usages recognized in commercially important centers
throughout the country) had received complete recognition in
Louisiana in consequence of Louisiana's cession to the Union in
1803.1 However Louisiana was, and remains, the only "mixed"
jurisdiction in the United States, operating under a civil code
drawn primarily from Roman, Spanish, and French sources
which underpins the whole of the state's legal relationships. Thus
as one would expect, the Louisiana Civil Code modified that
state's commercial law, influencing such important particulars as
the status of contracting parties, the theory of contract, and the
security devices regulating debtor-creditor relations. Many ar-
gued that this civil law influence was antithetical to the progress
of commercial law, with lawyers asserting that even the protec-
tions afforded a wife's separate property were anti-commercial
because they prohibited the husband from either alienating or se-
curing loans with such property.2 Nevertheless, as regards se-
cured transactions, civil law institutions were very flexible and
permitted optimal utility where the security interests of contract-
. Research Associate, Center of Civil Law Studies, Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
1 See Chaffraix & Agar v. Price, Hine & Tupper, 29 La. Ann. 176 (1877); McDon-
ald v. Millaudon, 5 La. 403, 408 (1833); Barry v. Louisiana Ins. Co., 12 Mart. 493, 497-99
(La. 1822); Talcott v. McKibben, 2 Mart. 298, 304 (La. 1812).
2 W. SAMPSON, SAMPSON'S DISCOURSE AND CORRESPONDENCE WITH VARIOUS LEAR-
NED JURISTS, UPON THE HISTORY OF THE LAW, WITH THE ADDITION OF SEVERAL ESSAYS,
TRACrS, AND DOCUMENTS, RELATING TO THE SUBJEcT 76 (P. Thompson comp. 1822).
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ing parties represented the object at hand.
Commerce in antebellum Louisiana was principally the bus-
iness of factorage, the practice of commercial agents buying and
selling vast quantities of agricultural commodities. 3 In the course
of their dealings, factors generated an unusually large quantity
of high quality commercial paper which ultimately undeiwrote
Louisiana's system of state charted public banks-a system re-
puted to be one of the soundest in the United States.4 It is appar-
ent that this commercial law environment was animated by a
psychology which recognized security as the foremost factor in
appraising risks. In other words, security was the heart of the
commercial transaction, and this commercial environment con-
trolled the evolution of the civil law institutions of suretyship,
mortgage, and pledge.
Security devices in the antebellum commercial environment
played their most significant role in the context of commercial
paper. It is difficult to appreciate the monetary realities of this
period which produced a medium of exchange grounded in com-
mercial paper in the absence of the federal government as guar-
antor. Personal security, then, was the essence of antebellum
commerce, and credit relations were highly personalized even as
respects the nation as a whole. Most important in securing com-
mercial transactions was the personal surety, and a mere accom-
modation endorsement on a negotiable promissory note sufficed
to create a suretyship in favor of a bona fide holder. 5 For
example, Baring Brothers' endorsement on a note was enough to
insure that note's negotiability anywhere in the Western world,
and Baring's reputation as London's first commercial house
would be honored even in the wilds of the American frontier.6
Similarly, Nicholas Biddle was able to prolong the life of his
Philadelphia bank many months beyond its actual insolvency by
3 See Ward v. Brandt, 11 Mart. 331, 423-24. See generally H.D. WOODMAN, KING
COTTON AND His RETAINERS (1968) (describes the cotton factorage business in the South).
4 See G. GREEN, FINANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE OLD SOUTH: Louis-
LANA BANING, 1808-1861, at 28-32 (1972).
5 See McGuire v. Bosworth, 1 La. Ann. 248 (1846); Gilbert v. Cooper, 4 Rob. 161
(La. 1843); Guidrey v. Vives, 3 Mart. (n.s.) 659 (La. 1825); Cooley v. Lawrence, 4 Mart.
639 (La. 1817).
6 R. HIDY, THE HOUSE OF BARING IN AMERICAN TRADE AND FINANCE 194-202 (2d ed.
1970).
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exploiting his impeccable reputation with European investors.7
While security was ultimately a matter of personality, other
confirmations of security as the crux of antebellum commercial
realities were recognized in the procedural remedies afforded
creditors when their debtors defaulted. The availability of execu-
tory process where the evidence of indebtedness contained a con-
fession of judgment is an example of a security afforded creditors
by means of a procedural remedy.8 Debtor relief legislation,
which was always popular in the western states, usually was
couched in procedural devices also, but Louisiana lawmakers
showed little inclination to upset confidence in the credit system
by availing those who defaulted on their obligations with proce-
dural escapes. 9 This article, however, will concentrate on the
substantive devices available to contracting parties in antebellum
Louisiana to enhance security, and demonstrate the role of the
specie standard in ordinary commercial transactions.
I. SECUBITY AND THE CIVIL CODE
A. Development of the Pledge and Mortgage
The Louisiana economy in the antebellum period was an im-
portant center for national commerce, and one would expect
that the very nature of Mississippi River commerce would shape
the evolution of Louisiana security devices. New Orleans was a
credit center for the entire Mississippi River Valley, in particular
for planters in the Deep South who relied upon New Orleans fac-
tors and banks to finance the operation of their plantations from
year to year. The factors themselves were part of an intricate eco-
nomic system based on national and international commerce and
like the planters, they borrowed heavily through commercial
channels to finance their credit. In this system, each party's abil-
ity to liquidate cash advances depended on a marketplace freed
from uncertainties, whether economic or legal.
In the search for eradication of uncertainty in the commer-
7 See B. HAMMOND, BANKs AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, 500-13 (1957).
8 LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 732 (1825).
9 See, e.g., Workman, Opinion of the Code ofPractice, Louisiana Advertiser, Feb-
ruary 9, 1826.
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cial lending arena, the most widely used security device in ante-
bellum Louisiana was the pledge, a basic form of security in civil
law countries which was virtually indistinguishable from its
common law counterpart. 0 The use of the pledge generally was
restricted to movable property, a distinction which the Louisiana
Civil Code institutionalized and which derived from the evolu-
tion of the pledge in the premier civil law jurisdictions of Europe.
Thus, the pledge became the logical security device attendant to
commercial transactions involving negotiable paper, a recog-
nized category of movable property. "x
A central problem with the pledge in antebellum commerce
as it related to negotiable paper was whether such paper was
transferred in the ordinary course of business to liquidate obliga-
tions or pledged as collateral security for advances of credit.' 2
Such a distinction was often difficult, if not impossible, to draw
with precision. In one sense, the pledge secures every obligation
existing between a creditor and a debtor in a civil law jurisdic-
tion, ' 3 but the application of such a broad principle inevitably
becomes ambiguous when a succession of creditors claim priv-
ileges on a debtor's insufficient assets. A transfer of negotiable
paper for a valuable consideration, or in civil law terminology, a
cause, theoretically is free of ambiguity, but the very nature of
credit transactions obscures every certainty upon which men or
business prefer to rely.
This ambiguity was exacerbated by the procedural burden
imposed on businessmen who were parties to a pledge arrange-
ment. Until the decade prior to the Civil War the pledge lacked
the flexibility contemplated by commercial imperatives because
the Louisiana Civil Code required every pledge to be executed in
notarial form. This involved authentication of the pledge before
a notary and two witnesses, and a subsequent recording in the
mortgage records.14 Clearly such requisites were a serious incon-
venience to commerce, especially when one observes that at that
time in common law jurisdictions it was possible to effect by pri-
10 LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1825, 3100-20, 3133-53 (1870).
" Id. art. 3135.
12 See Gray, Macmurdo & Co. v. Lowe, Pattison & Co., 7 La. Ann. 465 (1852).
13 LA. CIV. CODE art. 3183 (1870).
14 Id. art. 3158; id. art. 3125 (1825).
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vate act a pledge of any securities attributable to a course of in-
terrelated transactions, such as collateral securities derived from
a drawing account between two merchants.15 Of course, Louis-
iana merchants entered into pledge agreements, but their activ-
ities were somewhat circumscribed by the burdensome notarial
form required for a valid pledge. The inconveniences associated
with legal requisites for a pledge were greatly mitigated by the
factor's privilege, which will be described later. 16
Merchants, particularly when raising money, certainly were
aware of the formal guidelines surrounding the use of the pledge.
This concern with form was evident in Gray, Macmurdo & Co.
v. Lowe, Pattison & Co., 17 where the issue was whether the
plaintiff had acquired the draft sued on in full ownership or as
collateral security for the repayment of a loan. The Court out-
lined the historical inconvenience of the procedural requirements
surrounding the pledge when it observed that formerly the Civil
Code
prevented the circulation of negotiable paper, by way of
pledge or security, and limited its negotiability to cases of sale
or discount, in which the property in the paper was absolutely
transferred, unless the forms, required by the code, were ob-
served in the contract. These forms, men of business, in their
transactions, had neither time nor inclination to observe, and
the consequence was, of necessity a resort to some other legal
mode, in which negotiable paper could be made available for
the ordinary purposes of trade and exchange. Hence, for the
purpose of raising money on a note, which was not to be trans-
ferred absolutely, it was sold with a privilege reserved by the
owner to redeem it within a certain time.
These articles of the code, after having been a most serious
incumberance to commerce, were, by common consent, re-
pealed at the last session of the Legislature. 18
The articles that had been repealed, however, were in force
at the time the dispute between the merchant houses of Gray and
15 Fletcherv. Morey, 9 F. Cas. 266 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843) (No. 4, 864).
16 See notes 39-53 infra and the accompanying text for a discussion of factors and
vendors privileges.




Lowe arose. A third party, also a New Orleans merchant house
which had since suspended payments, had received money from
the plaintiffs and for this favor had agreed to "sell a certain
amount of paper [which paper obligated the defendant], reserv-
ing the right of repurchasing this paper at a stipulated price on a
given day."'19 This method of raising money in the market place
was very typical of the credit facilities New Orleans merchants
afforded each other. The redemption period for such "loans"
rarely exceeded thirty days, during which time it was possible for
the holder of redeemable paper to utilize it to collateralize other
unrelated credit transactions. A witness who testified for the
plaintiff regarding transactions of this kind noted that he
did not understand the transaction to be a loan, with the paper
left as collateral security. I would not have made a loan on a
pledge of the paper as collateral security; on the first transac-
tion with Greenland, Mr. Macmurdo consulted me about the
matter, and I told him, that a loan on pledge of paper would
not be legal, and that he must have a sale of the paper .... 20
The defendant argued that the plaintiff's claim to the paper
was faulty in that it was impossible to determine by which of a
series of contracts between the plaintiff and the holder the
former had acquired the draft in contention. The Louisiana Su-
preme Court, however, did not find such reasoning persuasive,
observing that to countenance such an argument "would estab-
lish a precedent which would operate a check upon a free and
fair circulation of negotiable paper, and [would] be an innova-
tion of the law as well as of the usages of trade in that article." 21
It should be noted that the pledge underpins all forms of se-
curity in the Louisiana Civil Code, whether it be the pledge it-
self, the mortgage, or suretyship. The characteristics which dis-
tinguish the security devices relate primarily to the nature of the
property burdened with an encumbrance and not to general
principles regulating the security acquired by a pledgee. The
pledge, as previously noted, is associated with movable property,
whereas the mortgage is identified with immovable property.
19 Id. at 466.
2 Id. at 468.
21 Id. at 472.
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Suretyships, on the other hand, effectuate loans of credit by con-
tracting a third party's personal security for the benefit of a cred-
itor. The pledge-like qualities common to all security devices in
the Louisiana Civil Code were especially relevant in the antebel-
lum period, a time when sensitivity to general commercial prin-
ciples and their practical application in everyday commercial
transactions was explicit in judicial rulings. 2
For example, one can observe in this regard the utilization of
the mortgage. One of the most creative uses made of the mort-
gage in antebellum Louisiana-in keeping with the Civil Code's
use of security to further commercial transactions-involved fi-
nancing the capital of the state's several land banks. George D.
Green has presented an excellent account of the political and eco-
nomic environment which fostered this unique innovation in his
Finance and Economic Development in the Old South,2 but it is
important to notice some of the particulars relative to securities
created in connection with financing banking capital. The acts of
the legislature incorporating such banks as the Consolidated As-
sociation of Planters, the Citizens' Bank, and the Union Bank all
contained provisions for financing capital through the instru-
mentality of bonds secured by mortgages on real estate. 24 A sub-
scriber to capital stock would execute a mortgage on real estate in
favor of the bank, resulting in stock subscriptions being financed
with loans secured by mortgages on stockholders' real estate. The
Act incorporating these banks also provided that mortgages thus
received were thereby pledged to the bond holders to secure the
redemption of their debentures, thus obviating the necessity of
complying with the formalities required by the Civil Code.
Every stockholder on depositing and pledging his certificate of
stock was "entitled to a credit equal to one-half of the total
amount of his stock."' The charters of these banks, contemplat-
22 See, e.g., Matthews, Finley & Co. v. C.M. Rutherford, 7 La. Ann. 225 (1852).
23 See C. GREEN, supra note4, at 109, 130-31.
24 An Act to incorporate the subscribers to the consolidated association of planters of
Louisiana, 1827 La. Acts, 1st Sess. 96; An Act to incorporate the Subscribers to the Union
Bank of Louisiana, 1832 La. Acts, 3d Sess. 42; An Act to incorporate the Citizens' Bank of
Louisiana, 1833 La. Acts, 1st Sess. 172.




ing "loans of money ... on mortgages, [and] discounts [of com-
mercial paper] on the faith of mortgages," contained one very
significant provision which permitted married women to obli-
gate themselves jointly and in solido with their husbands "to re-
nouice, cede, mortgage and hypothecate her rights, privileges,
or property, as well dotal as of any other nature of kind what-
ever." 26 This provision constituted a wholesale exception to
Louisiana's matrimonial regime law, which at that time segre-
gated the married woman's separate property from the husband's
patrimony and prohibited her from binding herself for her hus-
band's debts contracted by him before or during the marriage. 2
Even her dotal property, which was protected to the extent that
the husband's creditors could not look to it to satisfy their claims,
could be mortgaged, thus augmenting the husband's capacity to
borrow. The provision, no doubt, pleased those with a commer-
cial bias who regarded Louisiana's civil law as "too anti-commer-
cial." This represents another legal effort in antebellum Louis-
iana to lend greater security to commercial transactions under
the Civil Code.
B. Commercial Paper as a Collateral Security
Against this backdrop of the evolution of the pledge as a legal
tool to promote security in commercial dealings one can perceive
the significant role played by commercial paper in the commer-
cialization of antebellum Louisiana.
The importance of commercial paper as security was amply
elucidated in the early case of King v. Gayoso,ss wherein the
Louisiana Supreme Court noted:
To pledge a note, is, therefore, to make a legitimate use of it.
In the usual course of business, notes and bills of exchange are
used to pay debts, make purchases or raise money by discount
or pledge. He, therefore, who gives a bill or note, authorizes
the use of it for any of those purposes, and must know, by such
a disposal of it, the payee will enable the endorsee to repel any
26 d. §25, at 190.
27 LA. CIV. CODE art. 2398 (1870).
2 8 Mart. (n.s.) 370 (La. 1829).
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claim of the maker, on the score of want of consideration, con-
cealment, or compensation. 9
Commercial paper's importance as security was especially con-
spicuous in the relations of factor and planter, and it may there-
fore be helpful to describe a series of hypothetical transactions in-
volving the use of commercial paper as security.
The most basic transaction was one where the planter gave
the factor a mortgage on his plantation for future endorsements,
the mortgage thus securing the factor's endorsements of promis-
sory notes to be made by the planter at a later time. 30 The factor
furnished credit to the planter, which usually was accomplished
with either a draft on the factor or a promissory note made by the
planter and endorsed by the factor. In the latter instance, the
factor was treated as an accommodation endorser or surety and
hence solidary liability was established with the planter under
the rules governing suretyship. The factor either pledged the
promissory note or discounted it to secure his own credit.
Between planter and factor, and between factors, it was
common to advance credit by means of a promissory note which
had no other security than the maker's personal guarantee. The
lender gave his paper to the borrower, who negotiated it in the
marketplace with or without an endorsement, depending on the
credit-worthiness of the maker. It was not uncommon for the
planter to assist the factor in obtaining credit by means of a
promissory note secured by a mortgage on the plantation, which
the factor subsequently negotiated. 3' Negotiability and discount-
ing were controlled largely by the conditions of the marketplace;
thus, even impeccable credit would not insure a sale of paper at
par value. Thus, it can be seen that the pledge of collaterals was
an important alternative to discounting, and in a real sense the
pledging of collaterals was equivalent to a loan secured by an ob-
ligation.
2 Id. at 374.
30 See Brander v. Bowmai3, 16 La. 374 (1840); Bauduc v. His Creditors, 4 La. 247(1832); Roussel v. Dukeylus Syndics, 4 Mart. 329 (La. 1816), LA. CIV. CODE art. 3292
(1870).
31 Commissioners of the Merchants Bank v. Etienne Cordeviolle, 4 Rob. 506 (La.
1843); Yard & Blois' Syndics v. Srodes, 9 La. 479 (1836).
1981-821
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The paper market created by these transactions resulted in
varied consequences but it is important to note that its ramifica-
tions rarely surpassed the personalities identified with evidences
of indebtedness. A particular kind of security might flow from
beneath the waves of paper daily negotiated in the New Orleans
money market, but throughout personal reputation remained the
critical focus of this turbulent sea, and it is a mistake to assume
that collaterals alone mounted the most prominent tier in this
pyramiding structure. One judge of the New Orleans commer-
cial court admonished London's merchants "to make the neces-
sary enquiries before accepting paper drawn by merchants unfa-
miliar to them." 32 At another extreme, a prominent New Orleans
merchant was reluctant to raise a defense of usury, although con-
fronted with a flagrant violation of the state's usury prohibition,
for fear of harming his reputation in the financial community:
In opening the argument on the question of usury, the
counsel for [the merchant] Hagan, aware that his plea is usual-
ly an odious one in public opinion, and is also scanned with
something like disfavor by courts of equity, has defended the
reputation of his client, by suggesting that Hagan has never
sought to invalidate, as he says he might successfully have
done, the claim of the Canal Bank for its full debt of $12,000,
and eight per cent interest, and that he has only taken refuge
under this plea, at a late period of the trial, to aid himself in re-
sisting a vigorous effort made by his adversary to impose upon
him a personal liability for debts amounting, in principal alone
to $67,510, and bought by his antagonists for $470. This is a
question which concerns the reputation of Hagan, rather than
the legal merits of this controversy; but it is perhaps just to say
in passing, that the remarks of the counsel with regard to his
client's motives and conduct, seem justified by the record.33
Thus, it is evident that the antebellum Louisiana legal system re-
organized and relied upon emphasis in the commercial world
upon the credit reputation of commercial actors. This recogni-
tion served to enhance security in the marketplace against the
backdrop of a Civil Code often antithetical to the realities of
32 Lanfear v. Blossman, 1 La. Ann. 148, 157(1846).
33 New Orleans Canal & Banking Co. v. Hagan, 1 La. Ann. 62, 66 (1846).
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commercial intercourse. A similar prejudice against availing
one's self of legal recourse, which was shared by merchants gen-
erally, will be discussed in connection with the specie standard
and its relationship with commercial paper.3
In this regard, one should emphasize the legal atmosphere
surrounding bills of exchange which were an extremely impor-
tant feature of the New Orleans money market, particularly in fi-
nancing the credit of factors. Planters not only deposited promis-
sory notes with their factors to enable them to raise money, but
also frequently drew bills of exchange payable to third parties
who then endorsed them in blank. A factor upon whom such a
bill was drawn accepted it before maturity and negotiated it in
the money market, frequently receiving another merchant's ac-
commodation paper. The Louisiana Supreme Court observed in
Greenwood v. Lowe & Pattison that such cross acceptances "for
mutual accommodation" were typical in the New Orleans money
market, and further noted that:
To a lawyer, applying to such a case, the technical doc-
trines which govern in the general the contracts of a bill of ex-
change, or perhaps to a foreign merchant, the transaction
would seem anomalous. For as a general rule, when a bill gets
into the hands of the acceptor, the contract is functus officio.
But this seeming incongruity is explained by the common
course of business in New Orleans, with which every merchant
here is familiar, and to which it would be unreasonable for us
to shut our eyes, since it has so frequently been illustrated by
our records in commercial cases. The planters, as a class, are in
constant need of advances; the New Orleans factors as a class,
are in as constant need of discounts. Out of this state of things,
has arisen the notorious practice of the factor receiving from
the planter his bill on the factor, which the latter accepts, and
gets discounted in the market, puts the proceeds to the
planter's credit, and looks to the promised shipment of his
crops to place the acceptor in funds to meet the bill. Accep-
tances to the amount of many hundreds of thousands of dol-
lars, are thus, we have no doubt, thrown into the New Orleans
34 See the text accompanying notes 89-90 infra for a further discussion of the preju-
dice against merchants who brought their commercial disputes into court.
5 7 La. Ann. 197 (1852).
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bill market annually. 36
The issue of whether the plaintiff in that case had received the
defendant's paper in bad faith via another merchant was so
hopelessly intertwined with the factual situation in the money
market that the case was remanded for the taking of further evi-
dence and for a new trial by a jury of merchants, as it was "desir-
able to know what a jury of merchants would think in a matter of
this sort, which involves a question of mercantile good faith."a
The Louisiana Supreme Court thus showed itself as being very
sensitive to economic conditions and market realities, indicating
an awareness of the pressures which existed "at frequently recur-
ring intervals in the New Orleans money market, and of the pre-
carious character of certain classes of mercantile paper." a
C. Factor's and Vendor's Privileges
If Louisiana's early legal system was inflexible in the area of
security because it refused to allow a pledge of securities resulting
from a series of transactions to be effected by private act and
without a physical delivery of those securities, the practical effect
of the factor's privilege in large measure compensated for this de-
ficiency. In the Louisiana civil law system, a privilege is a right
of preference which arises by operation of law. A factor's priv-
ilege was reflected in the fact that the factor was completely se-
cure for the advances he had made to a consignor during the
course of a year, provided he had in his possession property con-
signed to him by the consignor, or provided he could show a bill
of lading or a letter of advice which indicated that the property
had indeed been dispatched to him. This privilege extended to
the unpaid price of goods that the factor had sold for the planter
on credit and it was applicable to a general balance of account,
not being restricted to specific advances made on particular con-
signments.3 9
A problem developed, however, when the factor's privilege
36 Id. at 197-98.
3 Id. at 200.
31 Id. at 199.
39 Gray, Durrive & Co. v. Bledsoe, 13 La. 489 (1839); LA. CIv. CODE art. 3247
(1870); LA. CiV. CODE art. 3214 (1825).
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and the vendor's privilege on movables arose simultaneously and
encumbered the same consignment of goods. Competing priv-
ileges were likely to arise when a merchant was in failing circum-
stances, had possession of property consigned to him by a planter
or other merchant, and had drawn bills of exchange on a third
party, thus effectuating a sale of the consigned property. In the
latter transaction, often the buyer was a commission merchant,
entitled to a factor's privilege on all acceptances made on ac-
count of the consignor-merchant. The consignor was deemed to
have lost control over the property upon remittance of the bill of
lading to the consignee, but'often the only evidence of a transfer
of ownership was a warehouse receipt. Frequently, too, bills of
lading were attached to bills of exchange and brokered in the
New Orleans money market, thus substantially increasing the
likelihood of their being sold to innocent third parties buying on
the faith of the collaterals. But, such transactions appear to have
contained few if any pitfalls, because "[a]ccording to the course
of trade [in New Orleans], the bill of exchange drawn on a par-
ticular shipment, accompanied by the bill of lading, usually rep-
resents the price of property sold, or the means of re-imburse-
ment of the price to some party."40
Generally, Louisiana courts in the antebellum period re-
solved this dilemma by recognizing that it was more equitable
that a vendor who delivered possession of his property to a ven-
dee without being paid for it "should suffer by the acts of the
vendee, than that a third person who made advances upon the
faith of the vendee's possession should lose by it."'4 This judicial
posture was evident in Lee & Ritchie v. Galbraith,'42 where the
plaintiff argued effectively that the "lien" of the consignee did
not exist, because the merchandise had not been consigned to the
intervenors for sale, and that the vendor's privilege of the plain-
tiff was still in force, since the defendant-vendee still had posses-
sion of the goods. The intervenors had, however, made advances
on the goods in the vendee's possession and certainly seemed to
satisfy most of the criteria for entitlement to a factor's privilege,
40 Fetter v. Field, 1 La. Ann. 80, 82-83 (1846).




except that the transaction more or less resembled a sale.
In addition, the plaintiff relied upon the Civil Code pledge
provisions by arguing that the intervenor also was not a pledgee,
although he held warehouse receipts for the property, because
"the act required by article 3125" had not been executed4 3 To
support this position, he cited Erwin v. Torrey, 44 a case which in-
volved a conflict of privileges between a vendor and a factor who
had made advances, and the plaintiff further noted that in Fetter
v. Field45 "the fact of possession, and the change of possession ac-
cording to the usual course of business" was decisive in determin-
ing whether the vendor's or the factor's privilege would prevail .4
Counsel for the defendant-intervenor, however, presented an ex-
cellent brief which argued for recognition of commercial real-
ities:
On what principle, then, of commercial law or of public
policy, can it be held that the defendants should, on this ac-
count, forfeit their privilege on the property? The object of the
law in conceding a privilege to commission merchants for their
advances, is to facilitate commercial transactions, by enabling
the holders of property to obtain money upon it in advance of
the sale, and thus wait a favorable market.
It will not be denied that it is altogether repugnant to this
system to incumber commercial transactions with the formal-
ities of the contract of pledge, as required by the code. It is true
that the system has not been fully recognized and uniformly
upheld by the courts of this State. In some instances it has been
marred and impaired by the application of the provisions of
the code to cases, to which it is believed they were never in-
tended to apply, and where such application has produced
nothing but mischief and confusion. In other instances, the in-
convenience and evil consequences of such an infringement of
the commercial law, as recognised by all other States, were so
obvious and glaring that even the positive enactments of the
code were made to yield to the "customs of merchants." The
43 Id. at 343-46 (arguments of counsel).
44 8 Mart. 90 (La. 1820), cited by counsel in 5 La. Ann. at 344.
45 1 La. Ann. 80 (1846), cited by counsel in 5 La. Ann. at 344.
46 1 La. Ann. at 84, quoted by counsel in 5 La. Ann. at 344.
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result has been that our commercial system, if we may be said
to have a commercial system, is deformed and incongruous.
But in recent cases the courts have evidently sought to restore
our jurisprudence to a conformity with the Commercial Code
of the other States. The present case presents another opportu-
nity to decide whether commercial contracts in this State shall
be decided according to the Commercial Law, which has been
so often held to be in force, or shall continue subject to the
doubts and perplexities of conflicting systems of jurispru-
dence. 47
The Louisiana Supreme Court took a rather restrictive view
of commercial realities and held that the plaintiff-vendor's deliv-
ery of the property to the vendee had been injudicious.48 There-
fore, the intervenors' claim was proclaimed the superior one and
the Court thereby struck a blow for legal recognition of commer-
cial realities. At the same time, it seems likely that, but for the
transfer of the warehouse receipts to the intervenor, the vendor's
privilege would have prevailed; nevertheless, neither conclusion
resulted in a uniform rule to what was essentially a practical di-
lemma in the context of commercial realities.
The court's decision was bound to introduce a new con-
sideration, premised upon caution, in business transactions be-
tween buyers and sellers in the marketplace. A variety of rules
were developed to match transfer of possession with commercial
realities, and it is significant that possession alone became the
critical factor in analyzing commercial transactions. This point is
particularly important because, under Louisiana's law of sale,
transfer of ownership takes place at the moment the parties agree
to the sale and a physical transfer of possession is not necessary to
invest the vendee with ownership.4 9 Thus, the position of a third
party dealing with the vendee is strengthened considerably in re-
lation to the original vendor. Nevertheless, in the case of Camp-
bell v. Penn,-° possession was deemed to be the controlling criter-
ion and hinged in this instance on whether a transfer between
vendor and vendee was recorded on the black book of the cotton
47 5 La. Ann. at 346-47 (arguments of counsel).
48 Id. at 349.
49 LA. CIV. CODE. art. 2456 (1870).
So 7 La. Ann. 371 (1852).
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press where the goods had been placed by a broker for trans-ship-
ment. 51 This result was reached despite the fact that there was no
want "of good faith in these transactions, on the part of either the
plaintiff or intervenors. One or the other... [had to] suffer, by
the frauds of an unfaithful cotton speculator." 52 The dissenting
justice wrote most convincingly that the plaintiffs had advanced
money to the fraudulent speculator "upon the faith of the prop-
erty, of which he had substantially the apparent control," and
that therefore the vendee had "for purposes of commerce" actual
possession of the property. 5a It is worth noting that, although the
Louisiana Supreme Court reached a result of effecting a division
of the cotton between vendor and consignor, more appropriate to
the wisdom of Solomon than the exigencies of commerce, a
strong tendency to protect good faith third parties was still dis-
cernible, especially where the vendor failed to appreciate a usage
of commerce, such as in the case of cotton where a transfer of
possession was required to be placed on the black book of the cot-
ton presses.
II. THE SPECIE STANDARD AND COMMERCIAL PAPER:
THEIR IMPORT FOR THE CIVIL CODE PROVISIONS
ON MONIED OBLIGATIONS
Most historians concerned with the operation of the specie
standard in the nineteenth century have focused on the area of
banking. While banking was an important index of monetary
stability, as evidenced by bank charters which specifically pro-
vided for convertibility of notes into specie, it is important to
recognize that bank notes served simply as a buttress for a mone-
tary system grounded upon commerce. Bank notes merely sup-
plemented the money supply and, like bills of exchange and
promissory notes, were a type of commercial paper.-
To understand the monetary system in the last century, one
must realize that the federal government regulated that system,
51 Id. at 373.
52 Id. at 372.
53Id. at 376 (Slidell, J., dissenting).
5 See R. TIMBERLAKE, THE OfICINS OF CENTRAL BANKINC IN THE UNITED STATES 31,
187(1978).
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for the most part, only when necessary to finance the exigencies
of government in times of war. Generally, control of the mone-
tary system was in private hands and the composition of the
money supply was reflected in traditional instruments of com-
merce. Thus, as might be expected the monetary system appears
to have been fairly susceptible to commercial pressures, and the
fact that commercial paper constituted such a large part of the
money supply resulted in a certain symbiotic relationship be-
tween money and commerce.5
In the context of our analysis of the legal responses to the
Civil Code's structure in the areas of commercial security, we
will consider the operation of the specie standard relative to com-
mercial paper and the significance of specie convertibility for the
Louisiana Civil Code articles on monied obligations. In partic-
ular, Article 1935, which appears to limit damages to legal inter-
est where there has been a delay in the performance of an obliga-
tion to pay money,O will be placed in its historical context to re-
flect a contemporary monetary system that responded to cur-
rency fluctuations and changes in the course of trade, both inter-
nationally and between regions of the United States. Thus, it will
be shown that a vast area of consequential damages, which re-
sulted from monetary dislocations, remained outside the Civil
Code's regulatory scheme. Legislative efforts to control conse-
quential damages which flowed from the monetary environ-
ment, were few and always futile in their attempts to alleviate
hardships.
A. Money and Credit
In antebellum Louisiana, the money supply was composed of
gold and silver coins, governmental obligations, and, most im-
portantly, commercial paper, i.e., bills of exchange, promissory
notes, checks, drafts, and bank notes. The most familiar form of
commercial paper in everyday transactions were bank notes,
which had much the same appearance of a present day federal
reserve note. Issues of state chartered institutions were by law
54Id.
56 LA. CIV. CODE art. 1935 (1870).
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convertible into specie on demand, and the presence of a conver-
tibility provision in most bank charters indicated contemporary
acknowledgement of the specie standard's subsuming influence
in the monetary system. The role of bank notes in the monetary
system has been thoroughly documented by banking historians,s
but for the purpose of our study it is important to remember that
bank notes merely represented another kind of commercial
paper.
Banking historians have appreciated the role of the Second
Bank of the United States in stabilizing exchanges within the
United States and in providing a medium of exchange that ap-
proximated a uniform national currency. The extent to which
this institution represented a hybrid of banking functions, whe-
ther central or commercial in their character, should suggest
that, while the Second Bank was the largest bank in the antebel-
lum period, it was not deserving of the denomination "Central
Bank."59 Nicholas Biddle, after all, prided himself on associating
the Bank's vast discounting operations with the commercial
paper market, ® but after the demise of the Second Bank, note
circulations throughout the country were largely localized, rare-
ly passing between regions except to perform a clearinghouse
function.6'
The only form of commercial paper which circulated be-
tween regions of the United States in the antebellum period was
the bill of exchange. This most important instrument of commer-
cial credit was not only the sustenance of commercial banking
but was also a key stabilizing influence in the monetary system.
The strength of New Orleans banks, for example, in the antebel-
lum period has been associated with the huge volume of trade ac-
ceptances generated by commerce passing through the port, and
bank-note issues themselves were tied to the banking system's dis-
counting of bills of exchange.
This vital role of bills of exchange was especially accented in
57 See R. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 54, at 14-16, 90-91, 132.
" See id. for an example of documentation of the role of bank notes in the 19th cen-
tury monetary system.
5' See id. at 212-13.
60 See id. at 30-32.
61 See generally id. at 40-41.
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the commercial lending arena. The commercial banking system,
which comprised most of the Louisiana banking industry in the
antebellum period, could facilitate short-term loans of credit but
not long-term loans. Even six months was considered a lengthy
period for a loan of credit via a bill of exchange, although the sys-
tem did permit some flexibility in the form of redrafts. Long-
term loans secured by mortgages on real estate, as they exist to-
day, were practically non-existent, except where such loans were
negotiated through private channels. 62 The importance of per-
sonal credit for financing business ventures has yet to be fully ap-
preciated. Similarly, merit will be found in the supposition that
the absence of a uniform, stable currency in the last century con-
tributed to the difficulty of financing long-term loans through
the banking system.
B. Damages on Protested Bills of Exchange
The failure of the drawee of a bill to accept or pay the bill at
maturity resulted in the holder's protesting the instrument and
demanding payment either from an immediate endorser or from
the drawer. The particulars governing acceptance and payment,
a formal protest in notarial form, and whether the drawee had to
proceed against his immediate endorser or might choose instead
to sue the maker were governed by a complex structure of legal
rules which varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Much valu-
able information concerning the conditions of antebellum com-
merce may be discovered by mastering specialized rules, such as
the ones controlling notice of protest, but the purpose of our
study is to elucidate an historical perception that all forms of
commercical paper derived their index of value from the specie
standard.
This perception is evident when one considers that the par of
exchange utilized in international transactions was affected by
"any discrepancy between the actual weight or fineness of the
coins, or of the bullion for which the substitutes used in' their
6 2 See generally G. GREEN, supra note4, at 29-30, 66-67, 115-16.
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place [would] . .. exchange, . . . [and] by any sudden increase
or diminution of the bills drawn in one country upon another."'
The cost of conveying bullion from one country to another
formed the limit within which trade imbalances might fluctuate,
and the value of a bill of exchange purchased in the money mar-
ket for remittance purposes likewise reflected monetary fluctu-
ations. Thus, we can see that par value formed the center of os-
cillations created by trade imbalances, with species costs deter-
mining, in theory, the outermost limits of such fluctuations.6
Damages on protested bills of exchange were made to de-
pend, not only on the course of trade between countries or be-
tween regions in the United States, but also on currency fluctu-
ations. Justice Story was emphatic about this point in his seminal
treatise on bills of exchange, observing that the principal sum
was ascertained by "its true or par value at the place of accep-
tance or payment," so that any fluctuations in the relative value
of currencies would be compensated for when determining the
extent of damages. 5 In this regard, damages were determined by
the rate of re-exchange, i.e., the cost of a bill drawn in the coun-
try where the acceptance was to have been made on a country
where either a drawer or an endorser resided. The re-exchange
value contemplated the costs to the holder commensurate with
losses resulting from damage to his credit resulting from his reli-
ance on the protested bill, his issuance of paper against it, and his
inability to honor such obligations as they matured. There was
no burden on the holder to prove actual losses: re-exchange in
theory precluded any possibility of the holder suffering any loss
by permitting him to draw on the endorser or drawer for the true
value of the protested bill without regard to the costs of negotiat-
ing such a bill in the marketplace. The holder, then, was entitled
to draw on the endorser or drawer for the par value of the pro-
tested bill, but the costs of negotiating such a bill depended on
the par of exchange (equalization of monetary units of value),
the course of exchange (stability and fluctuations in trade be-
6 J.R. MCCULLOCH, 1 A DICTONARY, PRIcIncAL, THEORETICAL, AND HIsroRcAL,
OF COMMERCE AND COMMERCIAL NAVIGATION 657 (H. Vethake ed. 1853).64 ld.
65 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANCE, FOREIGN AND IN-
LAND §§ 30-31 (1843).
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tween countries), and the credit-worthiness of drawer or en-
dorser. 0 With regard to credit-worthiness, certainly there were
instances when a drawer's credit was so impeccable that a third
party came forward and payed the protested bill for his honor.
There are indications that, when a third party paid for the honor
of the endorser, the endorser still was entitled to claim from the
drawer damages that were attributable to trade fluctuations and
monetary depreciations. The allowance of such damages was
premised on the sound argument that the endorser's credit re-
sources, which might otherwise have been employed in profit-
able pursuits, had been used in the drawer's behalf. 67
It may perhaps be difficult to comprehend the justice of a
system which meted out exorbitant financial penalties to drawers
and endorsers of dishonored bills of exchange. However, it is im-
portant to reflect on the tenuous character of antebellum credit
resources and remember that commercial credit was a prerog-
ative of the wealthy. It is important as well that the credit system
of the last century lacked the multifarious dimensions of a con-
sumer oriented society. In that light, credit was too precious not
to deserve every safeguard, and most certainly antebellum bus-
inessmen first examined the security interests guarding their
transactions and then assayed the risks involved in their enter-
prises.
C. Legislation Respecting Ratesfor Damages
Attempts were made throughout the antebellum period to
limit the scope of damages on bills of exchange protested for non-
payment. Every state, including Louisiana, adopted laws speci-
fying a percentage of the bill's true value as liquidated damages
in lieu of re-exchange. It is difficult to imagine how such laws,
which varied among jurisdictions within the United States, effec-
tuated desirable outcomes if the parties to bills of exchange had
to assay yet another factor in computing the costs of credit. These
early attempts to soften the harsh effects of the specie standard in
6 Id.




commerce resulted from and were sensitive to the hardships
caused by monetary inflexibility; yet, specie was an essential ele-
ment for securing credit and it seems naive to suppose that legis-
lative specification of damages successfully ameliorated the im-
pact of fluctuations in the course of exchanges, whether between
regions in the United States or in international commerce.
Furthermore, the legislators completely failed to appreciate
the realities of bank-note depreciations and their connection with
the marketplace. The stability of bank-note issues in the nation's
commercial cities was grounded in the traffic in bills of ex-
change; thus, fluctuations in the course of trade affected a bill's
redemption in current funds and in the most exaggerated circum-
stances hastened redemption in specie. Given the scarcity of
specie in a panic environment, bills, too were also likely to depre-
ciate in value, thereby imposing an additional hardship for the
drawer who was legally bound to reimburse the holder of the
protested bill in specie or its equivalency in current bank notes.
Louisiana's first law dealing with bills protested for non-pay-
ment was enacted in 1805, during the territorial period. That
legislation distinguished between a bill drawn or endorsed in
Louisiana upon a person in a foreign country and one which was
drawn on a person in another state. In the case of the former,
damages were fixed at twenty percent "and so in proportion for
any greater or less sum, in the same specie as the said bill or bills
were drawn, or current money of their territory, equivalent to
that which was first paid by the drawer or endorser."8 Appar-
ently, the legislation contemplated depreciating currencies that
were particularly aggravated in the foreign trade.
When bills drawn or endorsed upon persons elsewhere in the
United States had been duly protested for non-payment, they
were subject to a ten percent charge for damages, but no men-
tion was made of equalizing currencies, an omission for which a
plausible explanation suggests itself. Bills drawn in dollars and
payable in the United States were redeemable in gold and silver;
similarly, specie also protected bills which were payable in the
currency of a banking institution, because banking charters con-
68 An Act Concerning Bills of Exchange and for other purposes, 1804 Acts of the Ter-
ritory of Orleans, 1st Sess. 96.
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trolled note issues with convertibility provisions. The Louisiana
legislation, then, contemplated damages as compensation for
fluctuations in the course of trade. Currency depreciations af-
fected all types of commercial paper, but it is fairly easy to dis-
cern that the specie standard was perceived as the ultimate secur-
ity for the immutability of contracts.
Legislative solutions for economic exigencies seem always to
be localized and at best suppressive of the most egregious features
of eroding fortune, and this maxim was certainly true regarding
damages or protested bills of exchange. Louisiana's legislation on
damages was revised in 1838, no doubt in response to the perni-
cious effects of the 1837 panic which had its origins in the Anglo-
American trade. The panic severely damaged the credit of all
major houses on both sides of the Atlantic and left in its wake a
voluminous number of bills drawn on England which were pro-
tested for non-payment. 61 Political realities demanded some form
of relief for Louisiana's men of business, who daily confronted
the realities of falling prices, local bank-note depreciations, and
vanished credit. In response to this situation, damages on foreign
and domestic bills were reduced by half, to ten percent and five
percent respectively. The matter of depreciating currencies,
whether foreign or domestic, was addressed specifically, and it is
indicative of the times that the legislature deemed it proper to
provide for varying domestic rates of exchange, a provision ab-
sent from earlier legislation.
Sect. 3. [I]f the contents of such bill be expressed in the
money of account of the United States, the amount of the prin-
cipal and of the damages herein allowed for the non-accep-
tance or non-payment shall be ascertained and determined,
without any reference to the rate of exchange existing between
this State and the place on which such bill shall have been
drawn at the time of the demand on payment or notice of non-
acceptance or non-payment.
Sect. 4. [I]f the contents of such bill be expressed in the
money of account or currency of any foreign country, then the
principal as well as the damages payable thereon, shall be as-
certained and determined by the rate of exchange, but when-
6 A survey of the Commercial Court records reveals that approximately 80% of the
cases tried involved dishonored evidences of indebtedness.
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ever the value of such foreign coin is fixed by the laws of the
United States then the value thus fixed shall prevail.70
While the Louisiana legislature and other state legislatures
sought local solutions to this problem, chambers of commerce
throughout the country often asked Congress during the antebel-
lum period to enact a law establishing uniform rates of damages
for bills drawn and payable in the United States. Congressional
reluctance to proceed in this manner can only be understood by
putting aside the seasonal trade variations between regions, the
ostensible reason for such a regulation, and focusing on the sub-
ject of damages and the implications for the monetary system of a
law fixing uniform rates of damages. A law regulating damages
would have required the federal government to substantiate a
paper currency suitable for the conduct of commercial affairs.
An integral part of damages was the costs of currency fluctu-
ations, and some kind of uniform medium of exchange in which
commercial men could invest their resources and receive value
was essential. One memorial noted that among Congress'
powers, which seemed to substantially involve the right of legis-
lating uniform damages, was the power to coin money and reg-
ulate its value. 71 Early in the nation's history, Alexander Hamil-
ton had observed that dealing in bills was "literally a branch or
form of the commerce in money between distant states and na-
tions." 72 There appears, however, to have been much distrust of
attempts to regulate the money supply, and certainly the war
waged between the proponents of the Second Bank and Andrew
Jackson only aggravated that distrust, especially for a national
banking system capable of supporting a uniform medium of ex-
change. The central banking functions which the Second Bank
had performed indeed paled against the background of its com-
mercial banking functions, which constituted its chief operation
in the American economy,73 and the supposition that the Second
Bank regularized exchanges and provided a fairly uniform na-
70 An Act to regulate the damages on protested Bills of Exchange, 1837 La. Acts, 2d.
Sess. 44.
7' H.R. REP. No. 135,19th Cong., 1st Sess 7 (1826).
72 Id.
73 See B. HAMMoND, supra note 7, at 300-12.
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tional currency in the form of non-depreciating bank notes must
be modified in light of the memorials addressed to Congress spe-
cifically requesting legislation to regularize rates for damages on
bills protested for non-payment.
D. The Louisiana Judiciary's Response To Depreciating Cur-
rencies
The extent to which Louisiana courts honored the specie
standard in fixing the value of monied obligations is not clear,
primarily because the instances are few where litigation eluci-
dated at all a particular sensitivity to value and the specie stan-
dard. For example, an extreme position appears to be the one
taken by one judge of the New Orleans commercial court who,
when confronted with a determination of value in Louisiana cur-
rency of a contract negotiated in depreciated Mississippi bank
notes, responded by establishing a scale of depreciation. 74 Most of
the cases reported from the state Supreme Court which have any
bearing on the subject involve Mississippi contracts, but they are
not particularly enlightening relative to the specie standard be-
cause the bank notes of that state were wholly depreciated. Rep-
resentative in this regard was the decision of Wilson v. Lam-
beth,75 where the state Supreme Court merely affirmed without
comment a lower court decision that the defendants had the bur-
den of proving a depreciation in New Orleans notes at the matur-
ity of a bill of exchange payable in current city notes. The plain-
tiffs argued that at the maturity of the bill and the time of the
suit the notes were "at par and equivalent to specie."7 6 There is a
forceful inference that had the defendants proved a currency de-
preciation at the bill's maturity the difference would have inured
to their benefit, and "[t]hey would [have been] entitled to judg-
ment. for the depreciated value at maturity, payable in the cur-
rency of the present day."7
74 Oliver v. Gwin (Commercial Court Records, New Orleans Public Library) (New
Orleans Comm. Ct. 1840), rev'd, 17 La. 28 (1841), reproduced in part in R. KiLBoURNE,
LOUISANA COMMERCIAL LAW: THE ANTEBELLUM PERIOD 200-02 (1980).
75 4 La. Ann. 351 (1849).




More pertinent, perhaps, is the earlier decision of Meeks v.
Davis,7 which permitted the holder of an accepted draft payable
in the notes of a particular bank to recover the value of the notes
at the date of protest. The defendant had tendered the amount in
the notes of the bank subsequent to protest which were "at the
time a discount of from sixty to seventy per cent." 79 Again, the
implication is that had the notes been depreciated on the date of
protest, the holder of the draft could have received no compensa-
tion for an erosion of the notes' par value.
Nevertheless, the Louisiana Supreme Court showed some
willingness to avoid the most preposterous results of enforcement
of various Mississippi debtor relief statutes. For instance, in the
case of Roberts ex rel. Trustees of the Bank of the United States v.
Stark,80 litigation centered on an 1840 Mississippi statute which
prohibited the banks of that state from negotiating evidences of
indebtedness in commerce where the debtors of those banks had
received their bank notes. The legislation practically eliminated
the negotiability of commercial paper in Mississippi and, as the
plaintiff's petition noted, the law probably was in contravention
of the federal constitutional prohibition on a state's passing a law
impairing the obligation of a contract. The plaintiffs petition
further noted:
The object of the act of 1840, was to enable the debtors of
the banks, under all circumstances, to pay their debts in the
notes of the banks.
It cannot be doubted that a tender of either specie or notes, at
the maturity of the notes, would have been a good tender. In
the default of the debtor, perhaps the only remedy of the cred-
itor, in the State of Mississippi, would be an action for dam-
ages to be determined, and the value of the bank note in spe-
cie, at the maturity of the notes.81
In reviewing the decisions of Mississippi courts relative to the sta-
tute's meaning, the Louisiana Supreme Court had occasion to
78 3 Rob. 326 (La. 1842).
791 Id. at 327.
80 3 La. Ann. 71 (1848).
81 Id. at 71-72 (emphasis added).
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quote from an opinion by the chief justice of that state's highest
tribunal:
Bank paper [in Mississippi] was then very much depreciated
and the country was full of this depreciated currency, and it
[the legislation] was designed to secure to debtors the right to
pay the banks in their own notes. By allowing them to transfer
their notes, debtors would have been compelled to pay the en-
dorsees in the constitutional currency.8 2
The Louisiana Supreme Court managed to avoid the task of ap-
plying the statute, however, holding that the consideration given
by the plaintiff for the notes was lawful and adequate.
The Mississippi statute received some further elucidation in
the case of Roberts v. Wilkinson. 83 In that case, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court seems to have adopted the position that, once a
debtor was in default on an obligation, he owed the price, not
the value, of current bank notes, "unless he shall have given the
creditor the benefit" of an equivalent to the price. 8 All of the ob-
ligations sued on in these cases involved commercial paper made
payable in the "current" funds or notes of particular banks or
banks in a city or region, thus presenting an obvious difficulty for
Louisiana courts in countervailing the tenor of contracts and sub-
stituting the specie standard. Where bills were drawn payable in
dollars with no other description, parties likely settled in specie
or its equivalent in currency. Furthermore, some debtors, even
Mississippi ones, felt obliged to redeem their obligations in specie
or its equivalency in current bank notes, regardness of the tenor
of their evidences of indebtedness, in order to preserve their cred-
it rating."'
The earliest case before the Louisiana Supreme Court having
any bearing on the subject of depreciating currencies appears to
be Veeche v. Grayson,86 and it is significant that the court was
called upon to recognize a Kentucky custom, or usage of trade,
82 Id. at 74 (quoting President of Planters Bank of Mississippi v. Sharp, 7 Miss. (4
S.AM.) 1, 5-6 (1844)).
83 5 La. Ann. 369 (1850).
'4 Id. at 378.
85 See Oliver v. Gwin (Commercial Court Records, New Orleans Public Library),
reproduced in part in B. KILBoum, supra note 74, at 200-02.
86 1 Mart. (n.s.) 133 (La. 1823).
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that made "the notes or contracts of individuals, there made [in
Kentucky] to pay money," payable in the notes of the Bank of
Kentucky.8 7 The Louisiana Supreme Court evidently was anxious
to avoid the consequences of forcing creditors to accept tenders of
depreciated currency. The defendant-debtor offered to prove
"that before, at, and ever since the execution of the note, the cur-
rency and medium of exchange in Kentucky, where it was exe-
cuted, consisted of notes of the Bank of Kentucky and its
branches, . . . unless the contract expressly provide[d] for pay-
ment in specie; that the note sued upon, had no such provi-
sion.""'
When the defendant tendered notes of the Bank of Kentucky,
the plaintiff had refused to accept. Implicit in the Supreme
Court's approval of the district judge's refusal to allow the defen-
dant to prove that such a custom prevailed in Kentucky was a
recognition that the note sued upon was a negotiable instrument,
although the payee had never negotiated it. The Court looked to
the federal constitution, noting that:
[B]y the constitution... Congress has power to coin
money and regulate the value of foreign coins-art. I, sec. 8. It
is therefore to their act we are to recur, in order to ascertain
the value of the American or Spanish dollar. Parol evidence,
therefore, was properly rejected to establish, that the party,
who bound himself to pay nine hundred and seventy-two dol-
lars, intended to promise to pay less than his expressions mani-
fest, when tested by the law of the land. We therefore con-
clude, the court did not err in rejecting parol testimony, in this
respect."9
The dearth of Louisiana cases in this area suggests that New
Orleans merchants were reluctant to avail themselves of bank
note depreciations, reflecting a keen sensitivity to the personality
component of credit relations. The circumspection of the Louis-
87 Id. at 134. The Kentucky legislature subsequently passed a statute that recognized
this "custom", which precipitated the case of Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1
(1825), where Chief Justice Marshall enunciated the doctrine of state versus dynamic con-
formity to state rules of procedure in the federal district courts. See R. KILaoURNE, supra
note 74, at 16-21.
88 1 Mart. (n.s.) at 135.89 Id. at 137.
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iana Supreme Court in recognizing contrary laws of a foreign
jurisdiction, whether customary or legislatively posited, is appar-
ent when such laws tended to avail debtors of advantageous de-
preciations in the value of obligations generally. As the Louisiana
High Court observed in 1815:
The federal compact provided that the legislature of no state
should retain the power of maling any thing but gold and sil-
ver a tender in the discharge of debts, in order to avert in fu-
ture the mischiefs resulting from laws imparing the obligation
of a contract to pay gold and silver, by reducing it to an obliga-
tion to pay paper. °
E. Specie and the Civil Code Regulation of Monied Obliga-
tions
The supposition that the specie standard subsumed all forms
of commercial paper in the antebellum period follows from a
close analysis of the exceptions, formed by judges and law-
makers, which tended to ameliorate the harshness of convertibil-
ity. The legislation regulating damages on bills of exchange pro-
tested for non-payment forms an exception to the general com-
mercial jurisprudence that endorser and drawer were responsible
for all consequential damages occasioned by a bill's being pro-
tested for non-payment and in particular for damage to the
drawer's credit. The few cases which address the problem of de-
preciating currencies likewise seem to form exceptions for the
sake of ameliorating hardships.
90 Johnson v. Duncan, 3 Mart. 531, 541 (1815). The court further observed:
Yet the remedy was not commensurate with the evil; the healing process was
therefore continued, in order to prevent the passage of laws impairing the
obligation of a contract to pay to-day, by reducing it to an obligation to pay
on a distant day, or days or indeed any attempt at a legislative interference
between parties to a contract, by favoring either party, to the injury of the
other; and it was provided that no state should pass any law impairing the
obligations of contracts. If the restriction from making anything but gold
and silver a tender in the payment of debts, had not preceded that from
passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts, there might be some,
though very little, ground to say, that the latter clause would have been sat-
isfied by restraining the passage of laws authorising the payment of one
thing instead of another.
Id. at 541-42 (emphasis added).
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The import of these reflections for article 1935 of the Louis-
iana Civil Code should be apparent. That legislation dates from
the 1825 revision which was enacted in contemplation of a com-
mercial code, the projet of which was abandoned by the legisla-
ture in 1826. The corresponding article in the 1808 Digest was
very different, allowing an exception where "particular rules of
commerce and suretyship govern the case." 91 Significantly, the
articles in the Commercial Code Projet regulating damages on
bills of exchange protested for non-payment are similar to the act
adopted by the legislature in 1806; thus, article 1935 was subject
to an exception for commercial contracts that was embodied in
the Commercial Code Projet. The failure of the legislature to
adopt the Commercial Code Projet caused the courts to develop
exceptions for commercial contracts where an inflexible provi-
sion of the Civil Code would have constituted a burden on inter-
state commerce. 92 And, in any event, the 1806 statute, subject to
a revision in 1838, remained a legislatively posited exception to
article 1935 throughout the antebellum period.
That article 1935 contemplated pure interest on money con-
tracts is apparent; otherwise, the legislation of palliatives to curb
most pernicious effects of the specie standard are inexplicable.
Perhaps limiting damages on bills of exchange protested for non-
payment and permitting debtors to benefit from depreciating
currencies achieved some measure of justice in an economy
where a depression of value could be ascribed to all forms of
wealth. Besides, the incurrence of long-term obligations was a
practical impossibility. In an economic environment like the
present one, where a depreciating national currency accom-
panies stability and even appreciation in other forms of wealth
such as real estate, the justice of allowing the value of obligations
negotiated decades ago to plummet to nothing needs to be ques-
tioned. Some indexing of relative values may be in order, and, in
any event, article 1935 is not an obstacle to rectifying the worst
abuses of an inflationary economy insofar as it was never in-
tended to cope with a currency that fluctuates in value.
91 LA. CIv. CODE art. 1935 (1870). For an explanation of why the Louisiana Legisla-
ture failed to act on the Commercial Code Projet, see R. KILBOURNE, supra note 74, at 1-
70.
92 See, e.g., Wagner v. Kenner, 2 Rob. 120 (La. 1842).
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CONCLUSION
The singular character of Louisiana's system of commercial
law vis-h-vis the Civil Code was reinforced substantially by both
legislative and judicial recognition of custom and commercial re-
alities as a source of law. Custom contributed immeasurably to
the resolution of latent inconsistencies between two distinct sys-
tems of private law whose convergencies and divergencies consti-
tuted an essential quality of Louisiana's antebellum jurispruden-
tial heritage. The contractural character of commercial paper in
this context carries a particular significance because negotiability
was grounded in the custom of merchants. As one Supreme
Court justice wrote in 1821:
We would look in vain, in the laws of Spain, for the prin-
ciples that are to direct us in the transfer of bank paper. Great
Britain and the United States are, perhaps, the only countries
in which it forms the greatest part of the circulation medium,
and in which questions, like that now under consideration,
present themselves.
Since the establishment of banks in Louisiana, their notes
have circulated like the specie which they represent, as gen-
erally and freely as in Great Britain and the United States; and
this has insensibly introduced so much of the laws, usage, or
practice of those countries, as is necessary to regulate the mode
in which the affairs of these institutions are transacted, and the
circulation and transfer of their notes; perhaps, rendered obso-
lete so much of our former laws as is absolutely inconsistent
therewith. 3
Bills of exchange and promissory notes had been negotiated since
the foundation of the colony of Louisiana in the eighteenth cen-
tury. What the justice was referring to was an expanding facility
for such paper that might emanate from a variety of sources not
exclusively mercantile in origins. Later he would write that:
The circulation of [promissory] notes would be much checked
and embarrassed, if it were believed to be the duty of any per-
son, who receives one, to inquire into the fairness of the trans-
action in which it originated wherever the signature of a sub-
93 Louisiana Bank v. Bank United States, 9 Mart. 398, 400-01 (1821).
1981-82.]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
scribing witness or of a notary afforded the opportunity of do-
ing so.
Since the establishment of banks in this state, vendors have
often found, in the negotiable paper of vendees, a very easy
and speedy mode of receiving the price of property sold on a
credit. The latter, no doubt, found therein some diminution in
the price which would not have been yielded, if the former had
not thereby been enabled to receive their money, before pay-
ment was effected by the latter. 4
With regard to negotiability it is especially important to a
characterization of commercial transactions as essentially secur-
ity oriented in the antebellum period to see the holder-in-due-
course doctrine as a security or enhancement for a bill or note.
Freeing holders of existing equities between maker and drawee
was an incentive to negotiate such paper, just as a particular en-
dorser's signature enhanced the credit value of a bill or note. To
view negotiability in a strictly legal context, however, may ob-
scure important economic dimensions, such as the role of com-
mercial paper as a monetary supplement. Liquid wealth always
is more vulnerable to economic adversity, and in the antebellum
period the absence of a governmentally supported medium of ex-
change in which to invest no doubt hindered the growth of the li-
quidity so essential to commercial expansion. Even the most
liquid capitalist was probably illiquid a good part of the time
and, in consequence, very vulnerable when economic conditions
suddenly eroded the value of his commercial paper holdings;
hence, specie supported a very pragmatic psychology.15 It is diffi-
cult, therefore, to see negotiability as a judicial or legislative en-
terprise accomplished at the expense of society as a whole. 9
Public antipathy for negotiable paper was largely a matter of
intraclass tensions, because most people in antebellum America
rarely had an opportunity to discount a promissory note or draw
a bill of exchange. 97 In Louisiana, opposition to the status quo
94 Fusilier v. Bonin, 12 Mart. 235, 238-41 (1822).
95 See generally J. CLARK, NEW ORLEANS 1718-1812: AN ECONOMIc HISTORY (1970).
96 For a contrary view, see M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860, at 212-26 (1977).
9' See id.
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usually came from those who objected to the credit-allocation
processes of the regional economy, i.e., that New Orleans factors
monopolized the credit of banks."' It is difficult to equate credit
with social or economic injustice at any time in history, and cer-
tainly the exigencies of the antebellum period tended not so
much to affect the cost of credit as its availability.
Nothing in Louisiana's legal history even suggests that the ne-
gotiability concept was ever questioned with regard to either bills
of exchange or promissory notes. The earliest statute in the terri-
torial period was enacted in 1804, and begins as follows: "See. 3.
And be it further enacted, That upon all bills of exchange, and
promissory notes made negotiable by law, or by usages and cus-
toms of merchants in this territory. . . ." The Louisiana Su-
preme Court on one occasion elevated all endorsers to the status
of sureties, which certainly enhanced a holder's security, since he
could totally disregard the chain of title and proceed against his
most solvent endorser and collect the whole debt. 100
Louisiana judges certainly were sensitive to the need for
money substitutes, the often deplorable condition of local bank
notes, and the limited credit facilities which could be afforded
the very best business investment, i.e., the commercial transac-
tion. They seem never to have questioned whether commercial
paper was a necessary evil, and one judge actually deplored the
federal government's failure to come to terms with the issue of
what constituted legal tender. 10 Given the overall monetary in-
sufficiencies of the time, the work of the Louisiana judiciary rep-
resents a major contribution to economy and savings that bene-
fited the whole community.
98 See G. GREEN, supra note 4, at 28-32.
99 An Act Concerning Bills of Exchange and for other purposes, 1804 Acts of the Ter-
ritory of Orleans, 1st Sess. 96.
100 Wiggin v. Flower, 5 Rob. 406 (La. 1843).
101 Hatch v. City Bank, 1 Rob. 470, 470-82 (New Orleans, La. Comm. Ct. 1842)
(reprinted as preface to appellate court decision).
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